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ABSTRACT 
 The world community expects international criminal trials to accomplish more 
than their domestic law counterparts. International criminal trials are meant to further 
both judicial and political trial goals despite the potential conflict between these trial 
purposes and the accused’s fair trial rights. First, this article discusses what makes a 
trial legal or political and where along this spectrum international criminal trials 
should fall. Next, this article assesses each of the purposes underlying international 
criminal trials, contextualises them as legal or political, and analyses whether each 
should be relied on as a justification for trying a suspect in an international or 
internationalised criminal court or tribunal. Third, the article scrutinises the way in 
which the different trial goals interact and discusses the impact each political goal has 
on the legal purpose of trial. The article concludes that incorporating political goals 
into international criminal trials is necessary to fulfill the mandates of each 
international criminal law institution. Trial courts must balance the legal and political 
goals to ensure that the trial meets its aims but that when a political goal comes into 
conflict with the legal goal of trial, it is latter that must take precedence as it is the 
factor most concerned with ensuring that the trial is fair. Prioritising fairness is the 
only way to guarantee the continued legitimacy of international and internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals.  
 
Keywords: International Criminal Law, International Human Rights Law, 
Purposes of Trial, Political Involvement in Trial, Right to A Fair Trial 
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Article 
I INTRODUCTION 
There has been a proliferation of international criminal courts and tribunals 
since 1993. Despite this apparent demand for greater international adjudication of 
certain types of crimes, it has been pointed out that the question, ‘what are tribunals 
here for?’ has largely been left unanswered by the international legal community.1 
Although the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General and their own 
foundational statutes have set a number of goals for the different international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals to achieve, it remains an open question 
whether they actually being accomplished. This naturally leads to two related 
questions: first, whether international criminal justice institutions are accomplishing 
the goals set for them; and second, whether these international criminal justice 
institutions are capable of achieving their stated purposes.  
Answering these questions requires the identification of the method through 
which an international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal accomplishes its 
goals. At their root, such institutions are criminal courts. Criminal courts are designed 
as venues in which the criminal process is applied against an individual accused of 
committing a crime falling under the jurisdiction of the court. The culmination of the 
criminal process is a contested criminal trial and the purposes of the institution 
conducting the trial are realised through holding a trial.2 This leads to an additional 
question; can international criminal trials achieve the overarching goals set for 
international criminal justice institutions? 
  This article will discuss the different purposes assigned to international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals and examine whether criminal trials are 
capable of fulfilling those purposes. It will contend with the complicated problem that 
many of the different purposes are not necessarily compatible and that a balance must 
be found between these disparate factors. It will identify the importance of the right to 
a fair trial and use it as its guiding principle when weighing the different purposes 
against one another. It will conclude that fairness must be the overarching principle 
because without fairness international and internationalised criminal courts and 
                                                        
1 C. Stahn, ‘Editorial: Between “Faith” and “Facts”: By What Standards Should We Assess 
International Criminal Justice?’; (2012) 25(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 251, 253. 
2 R.A. Duff, ‘Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Concluding Thoughts and Further Questions’, in J. 
Jackson and S. Summers (eds), Obstacles to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Individual Rights and 
Institutional Forms (Oxford: Hart, 2018), 305. 
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tribunals lack legitimacy and without legitimacy they lack effectiveness. Therefore, 
those purposes that emphasise fairness will likely be dominant because without them 
the other purposes are rendered largely meaningless. 
II DIFFERENTIATING A LEGAL TRIAL FROM A POLITICAL TRIAL 
 International criminal trials exist on a spectrum; on one end is the purely legal 
trial, limited in scope to a determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused based 
on the evidence as assessed following the application of the accused’s fair trial 
rights.3 At the other end is a purely political trial, or ‘show trial’, in which all those 
involved assume the guilt of the accused in advance of trial. 4 Show trials are largely 
held to silence the political opponents of the group conducting the trial.5 There is 
nothing inherently wrong with a trial that prioritizes political goals over legal goals so 
long as such a trial is conducted fairly.6 Unfortunately, politically motivated trials 
have a tendency to put pressure on notions of fairness, which creates a danger of 
threatening the legitimacy of the trial as a whole.7 
Because international criminal trials combine both legal and political aims 
they exist somewhere along that spectrum. What is important to consider is where on 
that spectrum international criminal trials should fall to still be considered legitimate. 
The dividing line between a principally legal trial and a principally political trial 
should be whether the guilt is determined through the application of fair procedures.8 
Once the political goals become so prominent as to make the trial unfair it ceases 
being a legal trial and becomes predominantly political.9 The right to a fair trial is a 
requirement of international law and a court that allows other interests to predominate 
over fair trial goals loses its legitimacy as it fails to comply with that basic standard.10   
 This raises the question: how fair must an international criminal trial be to 
comply with the right to a fair trial? Antonio Cassese believed that trials ‘defend and 
                                                        
3 E.A. Posner, ‘Political Trials in Domestic and International Law’, (2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 75, 
82. 
4 J.I. Turner, ‘Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials’; (2008) 48 
Virginia Journal of International Law 529, 533-4; see also K. Campbell, ‘The Making of Global Legal 
Culture and International Criminal Law’, (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 155, 164. 
5 Ibid. 
6 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal 
Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 575. 
7 Ibid. 
8 S. Ford, ‘Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments’; (2013) 39 North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulations 45, 57. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid at 57-8. 
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protect human rights…by fully applying the international human rights standards 
relating to the accused, victims and witnesses and setting thereby an exemplary 
standard for future international criminal trials.’11 Although speaking specifically in 
the context of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Cassese demonstrates a preference for trials 
falling towards the legal end of the spectrum. This is exhibited by his emphasis in 
favour of a strict application of the rights of the trial participants as a way of creating 
template for future courts and tribunals. Colin Warbrick expressly rejected Cassese’s 
position in asserting that trials need only be ‘fair enough’ to all of the participants 
‘rather than aspiring to an exemplary or superior level of ‘fairest of all’’.12  This 
position demonstrates a more political approach to trial and its purposes through the 
implication that fair trial rights should not be rigidly applied. Instead, the focus is on 
ensuring that trial end in the correct result rather than on guaranteeing the fair trial 
rights of the participants. This view is meant to minimise the importance of ensuring 
that trial is fair; instead it allows room for the political trial goals to play a greater role 
by making fairness to the parties a less pressing concern. 
 In her seminal work on fairness in international criminal trials, Yvonne 
McDermott effectively endorses Cassese’s position while tacitly rejecting Warbrick’s 
approach to fairness. McDermott argues that international criminal trials must aim to 
protect ‘the highest standards of fairness’, which she defines as ‘full respect for the 
rights of the accused as established by international human rights standards and 
repeated in the statutes of the tribunals’.13  Respect for the accused must also be 
‘consistent with principles of fairness’ including neutrality, equality, and 
consistency.14 Fairness is important because a proceeding that is perceived as fair will 
positively impact perceptions about whether the trial is legitimate.15 Judge Christine 
van den Wyngaert also drew the connection between fairness and legitimacy in her 
minority opinion to the Katanga judgment. She reasoned that a court’s authority to 
pass judgment on an individual is directly related to the fairness of the proceedings.16 
                                                        
11 A. Cassese, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Human Rights’; 
(1997)(4) European Human Rights Law Review 329, 329. 
12 C. Warbrick, ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial’; (1998) 3 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 
45, 54. 
13 Y. McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
34, 147. 
14 Ibid at 34. 
15 Ibid at 23-4. 
16 Prosecutor v Katanga (Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert) No ICC-01/04-
01/07, T Ch (7 March 2014), para. 311. 
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The success or failure of an international or internationalised criminal court or 
tribunal, i.e. its legitimacy, is determined by whether its proceedings are ‘fair and 
just.’17 
 Mirjan Damaška offers a somewhat different perspective. He cautions that if 
demands for fairness are perceived as being too high, those in charge of applying fair 
trial rules will find ways to work around those demands.18 This view recognizes that 
the political purposes of international criminal trials do exist, and that those 
responsible for conducting international criminal trials will make sure that those goals 
are given proper attention during trial, even if doing so could diminish the overall 
fairness of proceedings. That being said, one must heed Jenia Turner’s warning that 
‘[t]he further a trial strays from its focus on the adjudicative function, the more likely 
it is to disregard the defendant’s rights in pursuit of non-legal purposes.’19  
 Cassese’s position is relatively non-controversial as it is easy to defend the 
proposition that the participants in a trial should all have full and equal access to 
existing human rights standards. However, the flaw in his argument is that it proposes 
an often unattainable standard. Cassese does not suggest any approach to how human 
rights norms should be applied when the interests of different parties come into 
conflict. All of the international criminal courts and tribunals have encountered 
situations in which the rights of the accused have clashed with the rights of the 
victims or witnesses. In some cases, the Statute or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence creates a ranking order of how the rights are to be applied. For example, the 
victims’ right to participate at the International Criminal Court is limited by the 
Statute to the extent that such participation cannot be prejudicial or inconsistent with 
the accused’s fair trial rights.20  Unfortunately, in many instances no such normative 
mandate exists. In the absence of such an obligation, international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals must make a choice. Either they must 
prioritise guaranteeing the fairness of one participant over the other or they must 
pursue a form of proceeding designed to balance the different interests of all of the 
parties. Unfortunately, neither of these solutions comports with Cassese’s desire to 
fully apply human rights standards of all of the parties. The first option benefits the 
                                                        
17 Ibid at para 310. 
18 M. Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’; (2012) 10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 611, 614. 
19 Turner (n. 4 above), 533-4, 537.  
20 Article 68(3) ICCS. 
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interests of one party to the detriment of others while the second seeks to 
proportionally diminish the interests of all of the parties. In either case, something less 
than full human rights protection is employed. 
 Warbrick’s response to Cassese does not really offer a solution to this 
problem. Warbrick explains that his ‘fair enough’ standard is met when a court ‘can 
secure the proper conviction of the guilty without doing too much violence in the 
meantime to the rights of the defendants.’ 21  His focus is entirely on what he 
understands the goal of the court to be, to convict guilty defendants, and whether the 
court can achieve its goals without infringing too much on the accused’s right to a fair 
trial. This is the wrong approach. By understanding criminal trials in this way, 
Warbrick is suggesting that there exists an acceptable limit within which courts can 
put other interests ahead of the accused’s fair trial rights so long as doing so correctly 
results in the conviction of a guilty accused. However, the application of this 
approach could result in obscuring the accused’s fair trial rights entirely. Whatever 
the correct balance between fairness and expedience may be, it is clear that fairness 
must be a paramount concern. Once a trial allows fairness to take a backseat to other 
goals it is no longer a legal proceeding and becomes a politically motivated trial 
seeking to achieve goals other than the legal conviction of the accused. That is 
impermissible in international criminal law as there are basic minimum standards, 
found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Statutes of 
every international criminal court and tribunal, below which the courts and tribunals 
may not depart. Rigorous respect for those standards must be preserved for 
international criminal law to maintain its credibility.22 
McDermott and van den Wyngaert disagree with both Cassese and Warbrick 
and advocate in favour of providing the accused with the utmost fairness. McDermott 
supports her position with two claims. First, anything less that ‘scrupulous fairness’ 
would run counter to the presumption of innocence and act as a form of punishment 
before judgment is reached.23  Second, choosing to provide those people standing 
accused at international criminal justice institutions with the fullest respect for their 
                                                        
21 Warbrick (n. 12 above), 62. 
22 W.A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1017; A. Reisinger-Coracini, ‘Cooperation from States and 
Other Entities: General Framework of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. 
Linton, S. Vasiliev and S. Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115. 
23 McDermott (n. 13 above), 146.  
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fundamental human rights, regardless of what they may be accused of, reveals a 
society that values the rights of the individual over the ‘vengeful and retributivist’ 
demands of the collective. 24  Van den Wyngaert takes an even more practical 
approach. From her perspective, it is only the accused whose liberty and property is at 
risk, meaning that he or she has the most to lose if the trial is unfair.25 This view is 
somewhat reductive, as it undervalues the sense of justice that victims can experience 
following a conviction, but it reflects an important underlying sentiment. The accused 
must not be convicted pursuant to a compromised procedure as it can impact the 
legitimacy of international criminal law as a whole.  
David Luban advances another reason for why fairness and legitimacy are 
inextricably linked in international criminal trials. He suggests that because 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are the product of 
political agreements they lack the inherent authority found in domestic legal systems 
that operate as a component of the government.26 Because of this lack of inherent 
authority, international justice organisations must ‘build their legitimacy from the 
bottom up’, which is accomplished by the quality of justice they deliver.27 Justice of 
sufficient quality to confer such legitimacy is derived from the fairness of the overall 
proceedings and the  procedures applied.28 This relationship between fairness and 
legitimacy means that international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
must priortise fairness if they wish to accomplish any of their legal or political goals. 
 That being said, Damăska’s concerns must be heeded and courts and tribunals 
should make every effort to avoid the overly rigid application of fair trial rights while 
continuing to maintain rigorous respect for those rights. If the fair trial rights of the 
accused are seen as being too inflexible, and particularly if they are viewed as a 
hindrance to justice, it becomes more likely that they will be limited or avoided. This 
is exemplified through various rule changes at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court. In the first instance, the 
accused’s right to ‘examine, or have examined’ the witnesses against them is secured 
in both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Statute and 
                                                        
24 Ibid. 
25 Prosecutor v Katanga (n. 16 above), para. 311. 
26 Luban (n. 6 above), 579, 588. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.29 However, due to concerns 
about the length of trials, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia changed its rules so as to introduce limits on the accused’s ability to 
examine some of the witnesses testifying against him or her. Despite this, the Tribunal 
saw fit to somewhat abrogate this fair trial right in favour of other considerations. The 
International Criminal Court also reduced the fair trial rights of the accused so as to 
promote other considerations when in 2013, the Assembly of States Parties 
incorporated Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and Rule 134 quater into the International 
Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 30  These rules allow trial to 
continue in the accused’s absence, a procedure that was previously thought to be 
incompatible with the accused’s right to be present at trial and the Rome Statute.31 In 
both cases, the institutions involved identified areas in which the right to a fair trial 
clashed with other goals it wished to achieve. Rather than acquiesce to a strict 
interpretation of fairness, they made changes to the rules that may have slightly 
diminished the accused’s right to a fair trial while enhancing other purposes of trial.  
 It is appropriate for courts to find a balance between ensuring that the trial is 
fair and achieving the other goals trial is meant to accomplish. Warbrick insinuates 
this, but his proposed understanding of the requisite balance is over reliant on 
maintaining the court’s ability to render a guilty verdict thus creating the potential for 
abuse. The sort of questions about the fairness of trial that this approach raises can 
lead to concerns that court or tribunal’s verdicts are unsafe. Those concerns can, in 
turn, threaten the legitimacy of the court or tribunal as a whole and make it impossible 
to accomplish any of the goals trials are meant to achieve. Instead, the balance must 
accentuate the accused’s fair trial rights so as to avoid any substantive suggestion that 
a trial was unfair and preserve the credibility of international criminal justice. 
III THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES OF TRIAL 
 It becomes increasingly more difficult to maintain the appropriate balance 
between the fair trial rights of the accused and the decision-making function of the 
court as courts attempt to incorporate more political goals into their decision-making 
process. The core purpose of trial is to bring the accused to justice in a fair and 
impartial proceeding, but international criminal trials are also meant to serve other, 
                                                        
29 See Article 21(4)(e) ICTYS; Article 14(3)(e) ICCPR. 
30 Rule 134 bis, Rule 134 ter and Rule 134 quater ICC RPE. 
31 C.H. Wheeler, The Right to be Present at Trial in International Criminal Law (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 
104; see also Article 63 and Article 67 ICCS. 
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politically motivated purposes, as evidenced by the political goals expressed during 
the creation of international courts and tribunals.32  In many instances those political 
goals serve a purpose other than the fair adjudication of the accused. This causes the 
legal and political goals of trial to come into conflict with one another creating a 
tension about the continued fairness of trial. This sort of disagreement is expected as 
different trial goals serve different purposes. However, it is necessary for the process 
to remain fair, and therefore fundamentally legal, even while simultaneously serving 
recognised political purposes. 
There are a number of different sources that identify the goals international 
criminal trials are meant to achieve. In a 2004 report, former United Nations 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan formally set out the United Nations’ objectives when 
establishing international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals. Those 
stated goals are:  
 
[B]ringing to justice those responsible for serious violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and preventing their 
recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, establishing a record of 
past events, promoting national reconciliation, re-establishing the rule of law 
and contributing to the restoration of peace.33   
 
The aims identified by the Secretary-General were, for the most part, not new, but 
reflected those ambitions already described in the foundational documents of the 
existing international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals. Future 
statutes would reiterate these goals while emphasizing those most important to their 
own work.   
 The United Nations’ Security Council made clear when it established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that it did so with three 
goals in mind: first, to stop the violations of international humanitarian law being 
committed in the former Yugoslavia, including mass killings and ethnic cleansing; 
second, to ‘bring to justice’ the individuals perpetrating those crimes; and third, to 
restore and maintain peace in the region.34 The Security Council echoed these goals 
when it established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by particularly 
                                                        
32 J. Stromseth, D. Wippman and R. Brooks, Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law After 
Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 262. 
33 The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. 
S/2004/616 (24 August 2004), para. 38. 
34 UNSC Res. 808 (22 February 1993), 2; UNSC Res. 827 (25 May 1993), 1. 
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highlighting the importance of ending the commission of international crimes in 
Rwanda, bringing the perpetrators of those crimes to justice and contributing to 
national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace.35 The primary 
distinction between the identified goals of the two ad hoc tribunals is that the 
resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda specifically 
identified the importance of promoting national reconciliation while the resolution 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia did not 
mention it. Despite this textual difference, Antonio Cassese, the first president of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, later explained that the 
achievement of national reconciliation is implicit in the trial goals of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal.36   
 In addition to trying to accomplish goals similar to those of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also attempts to 
protect the victim-oriented interests identified by Secretary-General Annan. The 
Preamble to the Rome Statute refers to the fact that millions of people have been the 
victims of crimes that ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ and then reinforces 
the important role the Court plays in punishing the perpetrators of those crimes.37  By 
including reference to victims in the Preamble, the drafters of the Statute intended to 
emphasize the prominent place victims’ interests occupy in the International Criminal 
Court’s system. The Court’s interest in securing justice and dignity for victims is 
further reinforced in Article 54(2), which compels the prosecutor to consider the 
interests and personal circumstances of the victims and witnesses when investigating 
and prosecuting crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, and Article 68(1), which 
obligates the Court to take measures to protect ‘the safety, physical and psychological 
well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.’38   
 The Security Council set out somewhat different goals in its resolution 
authorising the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In addition to 
expressing the specific desire to bring to justice those responsible for assassinating 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which the Security Council classified 
                                                        
35 UNSC Res. 995 (8 November 1994), 1. 
36 Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, UN Doc. S/1994/1007 (29 August 1994), para. 13. 
37 Preamble ICCS. 
38 Article 54(2) ICCS. 
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as a threat to international peace and security, it also stressed that the Tribunal would 
assist Lebanon ‘in the search for the truth’ about the incident.39 By identifying the 
search for truth as part of the function of the Lebanon Tribunal, the Security Council 
implicitly suggested that a court is an adequate forum for determining the truth about 
a given situation. Interestingly, the Lebanon Tribunal’s Statute does not mention the 
search for truth as part of the Lebanon Tribunal’s mission, but rather, focuses entirely 
on the legal purposes of trial. 
 Taken together, six major trial goals can be identified from the former 
Secretary-General’s statement and the Statutes of the various international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals. They are: 1) determining the 
individual accountability of the accused; 2) establishing the truth about the incident at 
issue; 3) fostering reconciliation in the affected region; 4) achieving long-term peace; 
5) providing the victims with a sense of justice; and 6) promoting the rule of law. 
Some, but not all of these goals have expressly legal underpinnings while others are 
designed to achieve more political aims. Although these goals are presented as 
individual topics, it is necessary to appreciate the connection between them and to 
understand that they are somewhat interdependent. There is no formal hierarchy 
amongst the different trial goals, however the court or tribunal conducting the trial 
may emphasize some goals over others in order to comply with its individual 
mandate.40 
3.1 The Goals of International Criminal Trials 
3.1.1 Determining the Individual Accountability of the Accused 
 Accountability is a term that has come to be used broadly and is seen as both 
an end result of trial as well as a means for facilitating a multitude of other trial 
goals.41 Accountability efforts have been credited with encouraging: reconciliation, 
deterrence, recognition of victimisation, reparations, truth, peace, representative 
                                                        
39 UNSC Res. 1757 (30 May 2007), 2. 
40 M. Damaška, ‘Part A Major Problems of International Criminal Justice, IV International Criminal 
Trials, Problematic Features of International Criminal Procedure’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), 179. 
41 A. Matwijkiw and B. Matwijkiw, ‘A Modern Perspective on International Criminal Law: 
Accountability as a Meta-Right’, in L.N. Sadat and M.P. Scharf (eds.), The Theory and Practice of 
International Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008), 42; C. Fournet, ‘Mass Atrocity: Theories and Concepts of Accountability - On The 
Schizophrenia of Accountability’, in R. Henham and M. Findlay (eds), Exploring the Boundaries of 
International Criminal Justice (London: Routledge, 2011), 27. 
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democracy, lustration and the cessation of ongoing conflict.42 Some of these goals can 
be achieved outside of the traditional boundaries of the courtroom and accountability 
processes in international criminal law are now thought to include truth and 
reconciliation commissions, the memorialisation of victims and ‘other guarantees of 
non-repetition.’43 
 Despite the numerous responsibilities assigned to accountability, and the 
increasing number of ways in which accountability can be realised, international 
criminal trials are most concerned with establishing legal accountability. 44  Legal 
accountability, in the context of international criminal law, is the only purely legal 
trial goal and it means holding individuals responsible for violations of any crimes 
proscribed by the applicable statute.45 An essential component of accountability is 
that only those accused against whom the relevant charges are proved should be 
subject to conviction and punishment.46 It is accomplished through an assessment of 
the evidence against the accused that results in a determination as to his or her guilt or 
innocence based on that evidence and imposing an appropriate punishment all while 
providing the accused with due process. 47 Legal accountability has been described as 
the natural counterpoint to impunity and the absence of legal accountability is 
considered immoral, damaging to victims’ interests, in violation of international legal 
norms and leading to the recurrence of atrocity crimes.48   
 Although accountability is primarily concerned with assessing the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, that determination cannot be made in a vacuum. It is 
essential that before anyone can be held responsible for his or her actions, he or she 
must have access to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is considered a central feature 
of the rule of law, a part of customary international law and has been called a core 
                                                        
42 Ibid; see also M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for 
Accountability’; (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 9, 23; O.N.T. Thoms, J. Ron and R. 
Paris, ‘State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?’; (2010) 4 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 329, 333. 
43 Fournet (n. 41 above), 27. 
44 Ibid at 28. 
45 S. Ratner, J.S. Abrams and J.L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, (3rd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
3, 10. 
46 Prosecutor v Bemba (Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji) No. ICC-01/05-01/08, A 
Ch (14 June 2018), para. 28. 
47 Turner (n. 4 above), 533-4; J.D. Ohlin, ‘A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: 
Vindicating the Rule of Law’; (2009) 14 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 77, 92. 
48 Prosecutor v Bemba (n. 46 above), para. 26; Bassiouni (n. 42 above), 19; Fournet (n. 41 above), 28; 
N.J. Kritz, ‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass 
Violations of Human Rights’; (1996) 59(4) Law & Contemporary Problems 127, 129. 
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human right.49 It is expressed as ‘a right to procedural safeguards to prevent an unjust 
conviction’ the purpose of which is to achieve ‘the proper administration of justice.’ 50 
Fair trials are achieved by providing a set of rights to the participants, particularly the 
defendant.51 These rights are detailed in a number of international conventions and 
treaties, as well as the foundational documents and rules of procedure and evidence of 
every international and internationalised criminal court and tribunal.  
 The right to a fair trial encompasses a number of legal safeguards, which if not 
observed, will call into question the validity of the trial as a whole. It is in this way 
that the right to a fair trial is linked to accountability. The basic goal of legal 
accountability in international criminal law is to properly apportion blame for the 
commission of atrocity crimes. That can only be accomplished if the court is given 
accurate information about the crimes alleged and the actions of those individuals 
involved in the commission of those crimes. If the information under consideration by 
the court is in some way suspect it could lead to an incorrect result. That, in turn, 
would mean the goal of legal accountability has not been fulfilled. 
  Punishment of the accused can also play a key part in accountability, although 
the extent of the role it plays is subject to debate. The importance of punishment to 
accountability is largely dependent on how different international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals prioritise the interests of the distinctive 
groups international criminal law is intended to serve. Two groups were identified 
during Kofi Annan’s speech opening the Rome Conference. In it he urged the 
delegates to develop a Statute for the International Criminal Court in which ‘the 
overriding interest must be that of the victims, and of the international community as 
a whole.’52 By identifying these two groups separately the Secretary-General signaled 
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that they each have distinct interests in international criminal justice. While these 
interests often intersect, the two groups diverge on the subject of the necessity of 
punishment.53   
The International Criminal Court’s emphasis on victims suggests that it will 
pursue punishment from a victim-oriented perspective. It is believed that victims are 
primarily concerned with the immediate redress of the wrongs committed against 
them, including the apportionment of guilt and resulting punishment. This has been 
expressed as an entitlement to ‘full justice’, which includes the trial of the alleged 
perpetrator and ‘adequate punishment’ of the accused if found guilty.54 This view is 
supported by the belief that punishment is an essential component of delivering 
justice to the victims. 55  However, it is not universally accepted that victims 
necessarily link accountability and punishment. William Schabas writes that the 
victims’ interest in justice ‘may be better satisfied by society’s condemnation of anti-
social behavior than by the actual punishment of offenders’ and that in international 
criminal law the declaration of the accused’s guilt is ‘far more important’ than the 
actual punishment of the perpetrators. 56  In his view, the victims of international 
crimes desire the identification and stigmatisation of the perpetrator and a 
pronouncement by society that the offender’s behaviour was wrong and anti-social.57  
Conversely, the goals identified by the Security Council when it established 
the ad hoc Tribunals more closely align with the interests of society as a whole. This 
suggests it will approach punishment with those purposes in mind. The international 
community as a whole is thought to be interested in trials that will produce more long-
term and expressive benefits than those sought by the victims. These are often thought 
to include the deterrence of future atrocity crimes, the public vindication of human 
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rights norms and the promotion of long-term and stable peace.58 The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon’s Statute primarily highlights the judicial purposes of trial by declaring it 
was established ‘to try all those who are found responsible’ for committing the crime 
resulting in the death of Rafik Hariri and others.59 This statement of purpose seems 
largely focused on establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused and is less 
concerned with punishment. That being said, the Statute does make clear that 
punishment will result from conviction.60  
Determining accountability is the purely legal purpose of international 
criminal trials. Accountability demands an evaluation of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused based on relevant evidence during a fair trial. Punishment can also be a part 
of accountability, however the importance of punishment to accountability is largely 
dependent on whose interests the trial court is best trying to serve. While establishing 
accountability is undoubtedly important in any criminal legal context, it is unlikely 
that an international criminal trial will ever be entirely motivated by solely legal 
considerations. As has been made clear by the United Nations and the foundational 
statutes of the various international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals, there are other goals that must be accomplished alongside the legal purposes 
of trial. The challenge confronting trial courts is how to balance the legal and political 
goals of trial so as to produce a result that is both fair and just. 
3.1.2 Establishing the Truth 
Establishing the truth has been identified as ‘the cornerstone of the rule of 
law’ and various international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have 
consistently identified the important role truth-finding plays in their missions.61 The 
truth established by a court or tribunal is believed to serve multiple purposes 
including: identifying an objective record of events; undermining denials about the 
existence of human rights violations; supplying therapeutic benefits to the accused; 
and the traditional legal function of creating a factual basis upon which the fact-finder 
can determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.62 This makes the search for truth 
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an overarching goal enabling the fulfilment of other trial purposes, particularly 
reconciliation and achieving peace.63   
It is unclear what amount of truth must be introduced during trial is to satisfy 
this goal. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated in 
2006 that victims have a ‘right to truth’ entitling them to learn: ‘the full and complete 
truth’ about relevant events and the circumstances in which they occurred; the 
identities of the participants; and the reasons for the occurrence of the events. 64 
Despite the emphasis the High Commissioner placed on ascertaining the ‘full and 
complete truth’, international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
rarely establish, or attempt to establish, the full and complete truth about a situation, 
irrespective of the accused’s presence during trial.  
There are a myriad of reasons why international criminal justice institutions 
are disinclined to attempt to establish the full and complete truth about a situation or 
conflict. One of the most prominent is the need to limit the evidence introduced 
during trial to information that is relevant to the accused and the charges alleged 
against him or her. 65 Allowing the introduction of evidence outside of the scope of 
the charges is unfair to the accused as it exposes the fact-finder to irrelevant and 
potentially prejudicial facts and could result in the entry of a verdict based on 
improper evidence.66 As a result, little or no evidence will be introduced at trial 
relating to issues that do not directly relate to the charges brought against the accused 
or to aspects of the prosecution’s case that are uncontested.67 The requirement that 
evidence be relevant can also lead to the omission from the record of facts relating to 
the actions of individuals or organisations not on trial, or facts that are considered too 
remote in time or place to have a bearing on the proceedings.68 This results in the 
historical record being viewed through the filter of legal rules and procedure rather 
than being the product of a neutral presentation of the facts. 69  This omission of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice’; (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 592, 593. 
63 Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace’ (n. 42 above), 24. 
64 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to Truth: Report of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (8 February 2006), § 
59. 
65 E. Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope over 
Experience’, in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds.), The Permanent International 
Criminal Court, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 328-29. 
66 Ohlin (n. 47 above), 95. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 75. 
 17 
evidence can often be unsatisfactory for victims as it can mean that evidence relevant 
to their victimisation might go unaddressed during trial.  
 The willingness of international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals to permit the accused to enter a guilty plea also demonstrates a penchant for 
conducting trials that will not result in the establishment of the full and complete 
truth. Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia expressed its concern about this in Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić. In 
particular, the Trial Chamber worried that a guilty plea necessarily prevented the 
development of a full and complete record of the facts.70 The Trial Chamber was 
particularly troubled by plea agreements reached under Rule 62 ter, which permit the 
accused to enter a guilty plea only as to certain agreed upon facts.71 It felt that under 
these circumstances ‘[n]either the public, nor the judges themselves come closer to 
know the truth beyond what is accepted in the plea agreement’ potentially creating ‘an 
unfortunate gap in the public and historical record of the concrete case’. 72  The 
International Criminal Court’s Statute attempts to address this concern by allowing 
for the presentation of evidence following a guilty plea, including witness testimony, 
‘in the interests of justice’ and ‘in particular, the interests of the victims’.73 Whether 
this flexibility to allow the introduction of additional evidence following a guilty plea 
will contribute to a fuller factual record remains to be seen as the procedure has only 
been used once, and in that instance evidence was only presented for two days.74 
 Identifying the truth about a situation is acknowledged as one of the most 
important political purposes of trial. When done properly it can lead to the conviction 
or acquittal of the accused and promote reconciliation and peace in conflict-affected 
communities. Unfortunately, trials are an imperfect forum for establishing the truth. 
This is partly due to the legal goals of trial and the need to avoid prejudicing the 
accused. Truth presented during trial must necessarily be limited to evidence bearing 
on the guilt or innocence of the accused with regard to the charges that have been 
brought by the prosecution. This excludes wide swathes of information about an 
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incident or situation that may be objectively true but is not relevant to the case at bar. 
Limiting the exploration of truth in this way creates a gap between the actual truth and 
the truth presented at trial. This gap prevents the victims from ever learning the ‘full 
and complete truth’ to which they are entitled as a matter of right and which may be 
necessary for them to experience a sense that justice has been accomplished. This 
suggests that while determining the truth may be the most important trial goal because 
of the role it plays in facilitating the other legal and political goals, it cannot serve as 
the sole justification for trial independent of those other purposes.  
3.1.3 Fostering Reconciliation 
The important connection between truth and reconciliation was highlighted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations when it declared that 2009 was to be the 
‘International Year of Reconciliation’.75  In its declaration, the General Assembly 
described truth as an indispensible element of ‘reconciliation and lasting peace.’76 
Unfortunately, reconciliation, and the conditions necessary to achieve it, defies easy 
definition. This challenge is highlighted by the following questions:  
 
Is it peace, the end of violence; is it contented individuals and families; is it 
communities where it is safe to walk the streets, to shop, to go to the mosque 
or church or synagogue, where women do not fear rape and where men and 
women feel no pressure to take up arms; is it economic opportunity, education 
for the children and dignity in old age?77 
 
Commentators concede that safety and security are critical components of 
reconciliation, but also question the meaning of those terms within the context of a 
post-conflict society.78 Some have focused on the attitudes of the people on different 
sides of the conflict, and particularly on whether there is tolerance and acceptance of 
people from different communities and whether they are ‘getting along’.79 Others 
described reconciliation as ‘the repair and restoration of relationships’ by ‘discovering 
ways and means to build trust so that the parties might be able to live cooperatively 
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with one another.’80 What these attempted definitions illustrate is that reconciliation 
can be approached from a number of different directions making it difficult to identify 
one single, over-arching definition. 
 The situation in the former Yugoslavia raises serious doubts as to whether 
international criminal prosecutions can produce the sort of reconciliation sought by 
the international community. 81  When the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia was founded, Antonio Cassese expressed optimism about the role 
the Tribunal would play in facilitating reconciliation amongst the parties to the then 
on-going conflict. Cassese believed that fair trials conducted by an independent and 
impartial tribunal would promote reconciliation, and be conducive to the 
establishment of ‘healthy and cooperative relations’, thus contributing to the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict.82 In Cassese’s view, fair trials, and the resulting convictions 
of those found to be responsible, would alleviate unresolved hatred and resentment 
diminishing the likelihood of renewed violence and the commission of new crimes.83  
Qualitative research suggests that Cassese’s confidence in the effect trials 
would have on reconciliation has not been borne out in practice. Janine Natalya Clark 
found that in Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘[e]xtremely high levels’ of mistrust remained 
amongst members of the different factions, that there was little contact between 
different ethnic groups, the contact that did exist was mostly restricted to business 
transactions and that different groups had very different understandings about how 
and why certain events occurred during the war.84 These findings led her to conclude 
that the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s judicial process had not resulted in reconciliation.85 
Clark attributes this lack of reconciliation between the parties to the perception, 
particularly amongst Croats and Serbs, that the Yugoslavia Tribunal is biased against 
them.86 What this suggests, and what Cassese may not have recognized, is that fair 
trials conducted by an objective tribunal cannot, by themselves, lead to reconciliation. 
Perhaps more important than the trials actually being fair is that they are seen as being 
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fair by members of the affected communities. 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s failure to 
create an objectively understood history about the war is believed to play a significant 
part in the perception that it is biased. 87  Establishing the objective truth about a 
conflict can support reconciliation by establishing indisputable facts that cannot be 
manipulated or denied.88 Unfortunately, the different ethnic groups in the countries 
that make up the former Yugoslavia have largely rejected the narrative created by the 
Tribunal and alternative narratives have sprung up in their place.89 This is exacerbated 
by discrete ethnic groups within each country developing their own understandings 
about the war that often conflict with national and international accounts.90 This has 
resulted in development of a huge number of histories that often conflict with one 
another on a basic level. The proliferation of such a multitude of different histories, 
many of which conflict with one another on a very basic level, makes it almost 
impossible to foster reconciliation as the people involved lack a common starting 
point from which to begin understanding one another. This disagreement about what 
happened during the war has also raised questions about the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s validity, particularly when it reached decisions 
that did not easily harmonise with a particular group’s understanding of events. 
 It is probably impossible for an international criminal justice institution to 
develop a common history that is acceptable enough to all parties involved so that it 
might facilitate reconciliation. To do so would require everyone involved to accept 
that each group’s version of events is equally valid even if their accounts are 
contradictory. This does not require consensus about the facts, but it does mean that 
the different interested parties would have to find a way to accept the reality that other 
sides believe a version of events that differs from their own.91 Producing an account 
that can be accepted by all sides can only be accomplished when the international or 
internationalised criminal court or tribunal adjudicating the matter is deemed 
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legitimate. However, it could also require the introduction of evidence that goes 
beyond what is necessary to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
Unfortunately, this approach would be at odds with the legal goal of 
determining the accountability of the accused. Relevant facts cannot be omitted or 
distorted in an attempt to fulfil the goals of reconciliation. Nor can facts be included 
that do not bear on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The accused’s right to a fair 
trial cannot accommodate a truth-telling process designed to develop an acceptable 
narrative meant to foster reconciliation. The trial court must find a balance between 
permitting the presentation of sufficient evidence to create an acceptable narrative that 
will promote reconciliation while also ensuring that the evidence is relevant to the 
crimes alleged. When a conflict arises it must be resolved in favour of admitting only 
relevant evidence, although courts should take a liberal approach to how it interprets 
what evidence is relevant. Such a system is most likely to ensure that the trial is both 
fair and also fulfilling the goal of reconciliation.  
 3.1.4 Achieving Peace 
 As with reconciliation, peace is also a frequently used word that resists easy 
definition.92 Johann Galtung suggested that the modern concept of peace could be 
separated into two different types, which he described as ‘negative peace’ and 
positive peace’.93  ‘Negative peace’ is defined as ‘the absence of organized collective 
violence’, and positive peace is ‘all other good things in the world 
community,particularly cooperation and integration between human groups.’ 94  
Charles Webel further developed Galtung’s theory by introducing the ideas of a 
‘Strong, or Durable, Peace’ and a ‘Weak, or Fragile Peace.’95 Strong, or durable, 
peace exists when there is ‘relatively robust justice, equity, and liberty, and relatively 
little violence and misery at the social level’.96 Conversely, peace can be described as 
weak or fragile when there is an absence of war, but also ‘pervasive injustice, inequity 
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and personal discord and dissatisfaction.’97  
The United Nations linked the ideas of reconciliation and peace in a 2006 
General Assembly Resolution.98 This should come as no real surprise as Galtung’s 
definition of ‘positive peace’, particularly the concept of ‘cooperation and integration 
between human groups’, is essentially describing the result of successful 
reconciliation, although in an environment that goes beyond the post-conflict context. 
To the extent that one purpose of reconciliation is to build cooperative and integrated 
relationships between different groups, it logically follows that such reconciliation 
will result in a peace defined along the same terms. This relationship between 
reconciliation and peace suggests that the problems precluding reconciliation would 
also inhibit peace.  
By describing the type of peace it would like to achieve as ‘lasting’, the 
United Nations is indicating that it hopes to achieve positive peace, or strong, or 
durable peace, when establishing international courts and tribunals. 99  It could be 
argued that positive peace is the overriding political goal of international criminal 
trials, particularly those that involve conflict and post-conflict societies. Truth is seen 
as being essential to creating a lasting peace as it can establish an objective account of 
past conflicts and reveal and validate the experiences of different groups within an 
affected area. 100  Reconciliation enables the achievement of peace by creating an 
environment in which respect and trust is extended to all involved groups. That 
atmosphere of trust and respect also helps foster a sense of justice and restores and 
protects the dignity of the victims. Victims of past crimes that feel as if they have 
access to justice and dignity are less likely to retaliate or seek violent retribution and 
are, therefore, less likely to threaten peace. The rule of law, particularly to the extent 
that it applies equally to all people, contributes to peace as it removes arbitrariness 
from the legal system.101 All of these political goals come together to create the 
conditions to facilitate and maintain a lasting peace exemplified by mutual 
cooperation, justice and respect.  
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 There are some indications that the legal goal of trial can conflict with 
attempts to achieve and maintain peace. The International Criminal Court’s Office of 
the Prosecutor made clear in a policy paper issued in 2007 that the interests of justice 
do not ‘embrace all issues of peace and security’ and that while the office would work 
to respect the mandate of groups working for peace, it would also independently 
pursue its own goals.102 This statement indicates that the Prosecutor will not allow 
ongoing peace negotiations interrupt the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
falling under the Rome Statute. This approach has been interpreted as an attempt to 
keep the legal duties of the prosecutor free from influence by political considerations, 
but may have the practical effect of inhibiting the peaceful resolution of ongoing 
conflicts.103  
 The situation involving Joseph Kony in Uganda exemplifies that conclusion. 
Kony willingly entered the Lord’s Resistance Army into peace negotiations following 
his indictment by the International Criminal Court although he refused to personally 
participate in the talks out of a fear that he would be arrested and transferred to the 
Court for prosecution. 104  The Lord’s Resistance Army’s demand that the arrest 
warrants issued against Kony and other members of the organisation be withdrawn 
before they would formalize a peace agreement became a significant stumbling block 
during the negotiations.105 No compromise could be reached about this issue and 
many commentators believe that the existence of the arrest warrants, and the Court’s 
insistence that those allegedly responsible for committing crimes in Uganda be held 
accountable for those crimes, was the ‘most critical impediment’ to a peace 
agreement.106  As a result, the Court’s overly formalistic approach to fulfilling the 
judicial goal of trial prevented a peace agreement from being concluded. Kony 
remains at large and the Lord’s Resistance Army continued to commit atrocities after 
the breakdown of peace negotiations. 
 There is also no clear sign that the legal process facilitates peace. It has been 
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suggested that the deterrent effect of imposing criminal liability for certain types of 
crimes will encourage peace. 107  This argument operates on the assumption that 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes rationally weigh the consequences of their actions 
before committing criminal acts. There is not much support for that assumption and, 
to the extent that perpetrators do consider the consequences, they largely focus on the 
likelihood they will be detained, whether they will be prosecuted and the possible 
severity of punishment if convicted. 108  Additionally, choices made under normal 
circumstances become inverted during ethnic or military conflicts. Decisions are more 
often made to indulge the violent inclinations that have become commonplace in that 
particular society.109 It is doubtful that such a deterrent sufficient to lead to a lasting 
peace will have any real effect on the actors operating under such circumstances. 
 One way in which international criminal trials may help to generate peace is 
by incapacitating certain actors through prosecution and incarceration. This sort of 
incapacitation can remove those individuals acting as driving forces to violence and 
signal to others that credible legal measures might be imposed against them if they 
were to incite further violence. 110  Returning to Joseph Kony and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, it is reasonable to surmise that if the International Criminal Court 
had been able to execute its arrest warrant against Joseph Kony it probably would 
have led to peace in Uganda. Kony is the founder and leader of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, a group described as ‘rigidly hierarchical’, and his name is often used 
synonymously with the movement that he leads.111 Kony’s personal willingness to 
enter into a peace agreement was thought to be the key to an enduring deal being 
reached, and because of that the Ugandan government sought a deal directly with 
him.112 The importance placed on Kony’s personal involvement in negotiating an 
accord suggests that he possessed the power to ensure that the Lord’s Resistance 
Army would continue to commit acts of violence if a peace deal could not be reached. 
Therefore, it logically follows that peace would have been the likely result if Kony 
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had been arrested and removed from Uganda pursuant to the International Criminal 
Court’s arrest warrant. 
 Peace can be split into two different types with one considered more favorable 
than the other. While the international community welcomes the absence of violence 
described as ‘negative peace’, it is most concerned with encouraging positive forms of 
peace that foster cooperation, social justice and equality amongst disparate groups. 
Whether international criminal trials can bring about positive peace is debatable. The 
example of Uganda suggests that a legal process conducted without adequate respect 
for a parallel peace process can prevent the conclusion of peace accords that might 
result in more positive forms of peace. In contrast, international criminal trials can 
contribute to peace to the extent that they can incapacitate those individuals most 
responsible for instigating violence in conflict-afflicted regions. Removing them from 
the scene, and demonstrating the illegality of their actions, can lead to the cessation of 
violence. However, this may not lead to the sort of peaceful solution sought by the 
international community.    
 3.1.5 Justice for the Victims 
Delivering justice to the victims of atrocity crimes has become one of the most 
important functions of international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
and it is considered a defining purpose of the International Criminal Court.113 In 2011, 
the prosecutors of all of the existing international criminal courts and tribunals 
released a joint statement underlining the importance of effectively and expeditiously 
completing their missions ‘on behalf of the victims in the affected communities’.114 
Further, officials from all of the international criminal law institutions have stated that 
supplying the victims of atrocity crimes with justice is an important goal of 
international criminal trials. 115  While recognizing the importance of victims in 
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international criminal trials, none of the international criminal law institutions 
substantively address what justice for the victims means in this context. 
Commentators have attempted to fill this gap by suggesting that the right to an 
effective remedy designed to eliminate the effect of the harm suffered by the victims 
as a result of the commission of the crime constitutes justice for the victims.116 While 
many different things might contribute to forming an adequate remedy, there are three 
primary components that must almost always be present. They are: developing a 
truthful record of events; establishing accountability for the crimes committed; and 
providing the victims with reparations.117  
The first two of these issues have been dealt with more generally above and 
their part in delivering justice to victims further underscores how intertwined the 
different goals of trial can be. With regard to reparations, the United Nations General 
Assembly asserted in 2005 that victims of gross violations of international human 
rights law or international humanitarian law have a right to reparations.118 Reparations 
are meant to be proportional to the harm done and can be grouped into five categories: 
Restitution, Compensation, Rehabilitation, Satisfaction and Guarantees of Non-
Repetition.119 National governments are responsible for reparations for crimes that 
can be attributed to the state and individuals must provide reparations when found 
liable by a competent court. 120  Prior to the General Assembly’s decision to 
acknowledge the victims’ right to reparations, victims were dependent on the 
individual rules applied at the international or internationalised criminal court or 
tribunal at which the matter pertaining to their victimisation was being adjudicated. In 
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general these rules allowed for very limited forms of reparations, and monetary 
damages were often excluded entirely.121 
Numerous studies demonstrate that people affected by atrocity crimes believe 
that atrocity crime victims should be entitled to reparations in recognition of the harm 
they have suffered. Ugandan and Kenyan victim participants involved in cases 
adjudicated at the International Criminal Court identified the prospect of receiving 
reparations as their primary motivation for becoming involved in the prosecutions.122 
Similarly, victim participants in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire 
placed reparations amongst the reasons they chose to participate, and also made clear 
that they expected reparations when trial concluded, although they did not identify 
reparations as their main purpose for cooperating with the Court.123 Other groups have 
also emphasized the important role reparations play in achieving a personal sense of 
justice. 97% of interviewees in the Central African Republic, not all of whom 
identified themselves as victims, thought that providing the victims with reparations is 
an important aspect of delivering justice.124 Further, a study done in Iraq found that 
most respondents felt that it was necessary to provide reparations to the victims in the 
form of rehabilitation and compensation to allow the country to move on from the 
brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime.125    
  International criminal law has typically only provided the victims with a 
rather limited right to reparations. The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone authorise reparations only in the form of restitution of 
property and proceeds obtained by the accused through his or her criminal conduct.126 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia limit reparations to 
‘collective and moral’ reparations and explicitly exclude monetary awards.127 The 
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not directly provide the victims with 
a right to reparations. Instead, it sets out the procedure it will follow to assist victims 
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receiving reparations from courts of national jurisdictions. 128  The International 
Criminal Court’s Statute goes further than many other international criminal justice 
institutions by permitting victims to seek reparations in the form of restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation. 129  Despite this more expansive approach to 
reparations, the International Criminal Court has imposed limits on which victims are 
eligible for reparations. At the International Criminal Court, a victim is generally 
defined as a person that fits each of the following four criteria: 1) they are a natural or 
legal person; 2) who has suffered harm; 3) caused by the commission of a crime 
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; and 4) a causal 
nexus exists between the harm suffered and the crime. 130  For the purposes of 
determining reparations a condition attaches to the third criterion to be applied when 
deciding if an individual qualifies as a victim. For a victim to be eligible for 
reparations, the accused must have been convicted of the crime that was the 
proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim.131 As a result, the interests of 
victims of atrocity crimes are divided at the reparations stage of proceedings between 
those who suffered harm as a result of a crime for which the accused was convicted 
and those who did not. Therefore, the extent to which reparations can contribute to the 
victims of atrocity crimes experiencing a sense of justice will largely depend on 
whether the individual victim is eligible for reparations.  
Reparations are likely to be an important part of justice for those victims 
authorised to receive them. Because reparations are only recoverable following a 
conviction, the trial and its outcome occupies a place of preeminent importance to 
those victims primarily motivated by reparations. Further, victims falling into that 
category may also be less interested in the application of fair trial standards, 
particularly if a compromised procedure proves more likely to lead to a conviction. 
That being said, an unfair process may negatively affect the court’s ability to achieve 
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the other victim-oriented goals of accountability and establishing a truthful record of 
events. As justice for victims is seen as being a multifaceted goal made up of all three 
elements, it would be dangerous to compromise the overall fairness of the 
proceedings so as to better achieve only one aspect of justice.   
 3.1.6 Promoting the Rule of Law 
International criminal trials are also thought to further the political goal of 
enhancing the rule of law. The rule of law is seen as serving three purposes: 
protecting people from arbitrary abuses of power; allowing people to make decisions 
with knowledge of the legal consequences of their actions; and to protecting people 
from arbitrary exercises of power by public authorities.132 Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon accentuated the importance of the rule of law when he described it as being at 
‘the heart’ of the work done by the United Nations due to its intrinsic link to peace 
and justice.133 The Secretary-General was tacitly indicating in this statement that the 
rule of law might act as the bridge between the political and judicial purposes of trial 
by connecting peace and justice through the rule of law. This connection is further 
borne out by the functions assigned to the rule of law. This approach recognizes that 
justice is a fundamental part of positive peace and that justice can only be achieved 
through the proper application of the rule of law. The rule of law allows the State to 
perform the purely legal function of adjudicating and enforcing those laws effective in 
its territory, while also accomplishing more political tasks including guaranteeing the 
separation of powers between different branches of government and guaranteeing 
fairness in how laws are applied.134  
 International criminal trials can play an important role in developing or re-
establishing the rule of law in national jurisdictions. These trials are seen as an 
expression of the moral authority as it applies to all of humanity and reinforces the 
notion that compliance with the basic legal standards expressed therein is part of 
being a member of the international community.135 When trials at international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are conducted in accordance with rule 
of law norms it provides an example for the relevant national governments that 
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atrocity crimes are morally repugnant and it reinforces the importance of requiring 
fairness in the operation of the domestic legal system.136 International criminal trials 
also raise public awareness about the existence of human rights laws and demonstrate 
that those laws were violated. The resulting enhanced visibility of human rights laws 
and their violation tends to increase the legitimacy of those laws, which in turn further 
strengthens the rule of law.137 Taken to the logical extreme, international criminal 
trials can lead to habitual lawfulness and the belief that committing atrocity crimes is 
not a logical alternative to peaceful, multi-ethnic co-existence.138 When people trust 
that legal institutions will deliver prompt and fair dispute resolution it leads to greater 
peace and reconciliation because it creates the atmosphere of fairness necessary for 
quarreling groups to find common ground. 139  International criminal trials cannot 
establish or re-establish the rule of law on their own following the commission of 
atrocity crimes. Instead, multiple participants are required to strengthen the standing 
of the rule of law. International criminal trials are meant to be expressive, both in an 
effort to encourage the growth of the rule of law in regions afflicted by conflict, but 
also to demonstrate the legitimacy of the trial itself in an effort to facilitate acceptance 
of the outcome.140  
 The evidence is inconclusive as to whether international criminal trials have 
had the desired effect on rebuilding or enhancing the rule of law. A study done on the 
impact that international criminal trials had on the rule of law in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia found that because the ad hoc Tribunals suffered from a lack of 
legitimacy within the affected States neither Tribunal had the impact sought on 
developing the rule of law. 141 The International Criminal Court also does not appear 
to have had much success in instilling victim participants with a sense that there has 
been any progress in strengthening the domestic rule of law. Studies conducted in 
Uganda and Kenya found that there was still widespread distrust for domestic legal 
institutions in both countries due to perceptions about political interference and 
corruption and the involvement of the International Criminal Court has done nothing 
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to change that belief.142 In fact, interviewees in both countries believe that the more 
likely outcome is that the respective domestic governments will have a corrupting 
influence on the International Criminal Court resulting in an overall diminishment of 
the rule of law internationally.143  
Research about the influence the Special Court for Sierra Leone had on the 
rule of law in Sierra Leone and Liberia produced more mixed findings. Most people 
in both countries believed that the Special Court for Sierra Leone had caused on 
overall enhancement of the rule of law, with more than 80% of the people surveyed 
attributing that improvement to the work of the Special Court.144  However, despite 
the perception that the Special Court for Sierra Leone had played a positive role on 
the rule of law, the researchers did not find that influence to be reflected in changes to 
domestic legislation in either country and they also felt there had been minimal 
improvement in the performance of law enforcement and the judiciary.145  
 Two relevant conclusions can be drawn from the results of these studies. First, 
it would appear that individuals from conflict stricken countries believe that the weak 
domestic approach to the rule of law is entrenched to such an extent that it will 
outweigh the efforts made by international criminal trials to improve the rule of law. 
In some cases the lack of domestic support for the rule of law is seen as being so 
strong that it will ultimately corrupt international criminal law institutions. This belief 
suggests that those surveyed do not have much confidence in the legitimacy of the 
international criminal justice institutions if they believe that local actors can so easily 
taint them. This leads to the second conclusion, that an international or 
internationalised criminal court or tribunal cannot have any effect on improving the 
domestic rule of law if the court or tribunal is not seen as legitimate. These 
conclusions accentuate how important it is that the people from the communities 
impacted by atrocity crimes perceive international criminal trials as legitimate. 
Without legitimacy, international criminal trials are unlikely to play a role in 
cultivating the rule of law.  
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IV CONCLUSION 
 Generally, international criminal courts and tribunals were established to hold 
accountable those individuals alleged to have violated human rights and humanitarian 
law. In addition to that legal goal, international courts and tribunals have also been 
charged with accomplishing certain political goals, particularly determining the truth, 
facilitating reconciliation between different groups, establishing lasting peace, 
delivering justice to victims and supporting the rule of law. The interaction between 
the different political purposes of trial demonstrate that although each issue is 
identified separately by the United Nations and the different international courts and 
tribunals, they all work together to form a cohesive whole. Because of the 
interconnectedness of the goals it is difficult to create a genuine hierarchy amongst 
them. These political goals also operate in conjunction with the legal goal and often 
the latter is expected to help achieve the former.  
 There is nothing inherently wrong with combining legal and political trial 
goals during international criminal trials. International criminal trials were designed to 
fulfill a number of different purposes, both legal and political. However, certain 
tensions arise when a court or tribunal tries to fulfill multiple goals simultaneously. 
The evidence needed to ascertain the truth about a given situation may not align with 
the evidence required to convict the accused of the crimes alleged. Reconciliation can 
be impeded if the evidence is viewed as biased or different groups feel its members 
are being disproportionately subject to prosecution. Peace may not be achieved if 
international courts and tribunals insist on fulfilling their mandates by investigating 
and indicting individuals involved in the peace process. Victims may not feel as if 
they have received justice if they are not able to fully tell their stories but such a full 
telling may not comport with the fair trial rights of the accused. Holding trials  
operates as a representation of the rule of law but may have no real impact on 
enhancing the rule of law.  
 Although it is unfortunate that the legal goal of trial may prevent the political 
goals from being accomplished, it is a necessary part of the legal system. While there 
is no formal hierarchy amongst the different trial goals, an informal order must be 
maintained with accountability ranking ahead of the others. That is because the right 
to a fair trial, as a fundamental human right, must predominate in the legal context. 
Allowing the introduction of evidence that has no bearing on the case at bar, tailoring 
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investigations and prosecutions to counter a perceived bias or failing to prosecute 
potentially culpable individuals to further external political efforts, do not comport 
with the mission of international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals or 
basic human rights standards. International criminal trials will lose their legitimacy if 
the political trial goals are allowed to predominate over the legal, and the trials 
themselves will become little more than show trials. That loss of legitimacy will, in 
turn, undermine any political benefits that might be derived from holding 
international criminal trials rendering them meaningless. 
